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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UI'AH
STA'rE OF UTAH,
J'LA1NTH'F AND RESPONDEN'l'
V8.
I

Case

lWXALD G. WILCOX,

No.

12798

DEli'gNDAK'L' AND APPELLANT
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
S'l'ATE.i\IENT OF KIND OF CASE
'l'his is a criminal action charging the defendant
\\ ith embezdement of monrys of the Cardiopulmonary
Care Clinic, Inc., a corporation, Defendant being President and .Manager of the CQrporation. Two checks were
involved, one for $2,757.72 to pay off a personal loan on
('ar, and one for $.)2.90 to purclrn::;e a life insurance
polie.\· with Defendant's wife as beneficiary.

DISPOSITION lN LOWER COUR'l'
The .Jury found Defendant guilty on both counts.
S01TGH'I' ON APPEAL
i)pfp]l(lant
a revenml of the jury verdict of
g·uilty of Embezzlement on Lwth counts as a matter of

law and fact, or, that failing, remanding the case to the
District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and Appellant at all times mentioned
herein was married and the father of three children.
-While in the service of the United States Anny, Defendant received training with the use of respirators and !
finally trained doctors and nurses in the use of same.
(TR 252, L 14-30; TR 253, L 1-5.)
I

:E..,or five years Defendant dreamed of
up a '
Clinic to assist people who needed medical help, especially as it concerned respirators and respiratory illnesses. During this early period he traveled California
and many western states gathering information relative
to the establishing of a medical clinic, visiting
hospitals, nuPses and clinics all at his own expense. (TR
2·53, L 9-30; TR 254, L 1-26)
Finally he actually realized his ambition and set
up Cardiopulmonary Care Clinic, Inc. as an Idaho Corporation the first part of 1970. Defendant was later
elected President, and Mr. Clark Fritton, Secretaryrrreasurer. Both signatures were required on Company
checks. CL1R 255, L 6-10).
Defen<lant knew nothing of accounting and setting
up and keeping records, nor of the niceties of corporate
law. (TR 256, L 15-21) and used only a check book with
stubs and ledger. (TR 260, L 1-29).
Because Defendant was doing all the work of setting
up and managing the busines:-;, the Secretary-Treasurer
2

c<H'ig11e(1 lll<lllY ('hecks in advan('e and Defendant would
lt;;e thern r._::; needed. (TR 256, L 22-30) State's own wit..; verified Defendant's testimony. (TR 61, L 21-30;
TR 62, L 1-20).
Defendant clairn1:l that he was originally authorized
t1i draw *200.00 per ·week as wages inasmuch as he was
il('inp; all of the work and this job was his sole source of
ineorne to support himself and family. Defendant also
testified that the Directorn agreed that he could write
checks for personal needs on unpaid wages-this defendt did. (TR 255, L 1-8; TR 273, L 1-30; TR 274, L 6-27;
TR :320, L 6-30; rrR 321, L 1-30; TR 322, L 1-30).
The busines1:l could not support itself so Defendant
loaned it money which he obtained from personal loans,
so111e involving his wife who tried to keep the Company
records; (TH 265, L 8-30; rrR 266, L 1-21) Mrs. Wilcox
i» titill paying on two of them. CrR 391, L 11-30; TR
392, L 1-23).
Defendant also permitted the Company to use his
Bank Americard and l\Iaster Charge. State's complaining witness admitted that he computed or ran a tape on
that use, which showed "around $26,000.00". (TR 261,
L 6-20; TR 112, L 21-31). Defendant claims the Company
has not yet paid al'l of this back. l\Ir. Porter at various
tiu1es admitted the Defendant claimed approximately
$3,000.00 due on credit card charges CrR 99, L 1-13; TR
102, L 17-30) and wage8 dne of approximately $3,000.00

(TH 116, L 1-2.J; 'l1 R 5:t, L -1-25) State's witness Lester
t'onl'irmecl Defendant's elaim for money owed

t'1i111 hy Llie l:om pany. (TR 235, L 8-30).
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There were no

denials by the State's witnesses that the Company still
owed Defendant money for wages or credit card charge 8
'J'he two checks that form the basis for the Embezzle
ment charg2s were negotiated in .June, 1970. rrhe first
was written by Defendant, admittedly, for the sum of
$2,757.72 to pay on his car. (TR 47, L 17-21; rrR 277, L
L 1-30). rrhe State's wit24-30; rrR 278, L 1-30; 'l'H
ness on direct did not ackno,vledge a deposit on the same
day by Defendant of the sum of $2,331.00 to the Company account, but finally did so on cross. rl1he testi- '
mony, unchaUenged, showed that Defendant telephoned
Clark Fritton and explained the transaction and got an
OK to do so. Defendant wrote the check for the purchase of his car then borrowed $2,331.00 using the ne\\
car as collateral and deposited this sum in the Company
account. '11he difference of $426.72 to be charged
against unpaid wages. (TR 280, L 21-29). Defendant
claimed approximately $3,000.00 wages due and unpaid
at this date. The State's witness admitted that the check
stub noted "loan payment"; (TR 52, L 10-22). The
check was previously co-signed by Clark Fritton.
The second check was one written to Jefferson
8tandard Insurance Company for $52.90 for an insurance policy premium with Defendant's wife as beneficiary. (TR 52, L 28-30; TR 53, L 1-5) Defendant did not
deny. erR 281, L 12-17; TR 282, L 1-23).
State's witness, who was Immrance Company agent,
Cooper, stated that Defendant told him that he had
a draw on his salary ( rrR 133, L 17-26; TR 134, L 10-17l
at time che<'k \'.'HS written-Defendant confirmed tltif:.
(l1H 282, L 27-:30; TH 283, L 1-10). It is interesting to
4

rntc that no one ever questioned Defendant about these

eJHdrn or objected to them prior to the issuance of Ernt complaints.

All of the State\; evidence concerning Defendant's
'was computed by either Mr. Porter or by the
('.P.A., Mr. \Viggins, and both admitted they arbitrarily
made many charges without evidence to support. Both
lt<t<l Jifferent amounts at different stages of the testimony. $3,350.00 (TR 83, L 4-15) $6,788.89 (TR 85, L 1-7)
$5,502.50Cl1R154, L 2-30; TR 155, L 1-30). No matter
how Defendant could possibly be limited, there were
unpaid wages due Mr. Wilcox.
ARGUMENT

J>OJN'l1 I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
VERDICT OF GUILTY RENDERED BY THE
.JUHY AGAINST DEFENDANT ON EITHER
COUNT.
rrhe State's case consisted of evidence that showed
the Defendant to have been the President and sole Manager of Cardiopulmonary Care Clinic, Inc., a corporation set up primarily by Defendant in the State of Idaho
in the first part of 1970.
Defendant, admittedly, had the sole responsibility of
:-;dting np the hnsines;s, hiring employees, driving
Y<>lii<·le:s, }Hll'('hasing equipment and so forth, and admit"lJent a great nmuLer of hours each day in doing
t>O.

5

rrhe books and records were extremely sparce; Defendant did not have the time or the knowledge to
tablish and maintain same.
In middle of 1970 the eomplaining .vitness was asked
b.v Defendant to become a member and director of the
Corporation to set up a complete set of books and records. l\Ir. Porter had some experience jn accounbng!
and, after going over the records, suggested to Defendant that a C.P.A. be employed to set them up. Defendant
readily agreed and Keith Wiggins, C.P.A., was employed.
1

Mr. Wiggins stated the records were vjrtualh· impossible to understand, but with many consultatiorn
with Defendant and l\Ir. Porter, did come up vvjth a set
of ledgers and balance sheets. He had only checks,
and ledger to work with and it was determined that if
no explanation of checks were noted on stubs he woulrl
ask what they were for and usually charged them against
draws for wages by Defendant, oftentimes arbitrarily
and over Defendant's objection. The State's witnesses
computed Defendant had drawn wages to be in varying
amounts-$3,350.00, $(i,788.89, and $5,502.50.
Mr. Porter admitted that Defendant claimed he
authorized to draw $200.00 per week as wages, and Jirl
in fact have wages due at the time the two checks wen
w1·itten. He admitted further that Defendant permitted
the Corporation to use his personal credit cards and approximately $20,000.00 worth of charges were made for
corporate use to tr,\· to keep it going.

that prohabl,\' not all had been repaid.
6

He also admitted

F'inally in .Tune, 1970 Defendant wrote one of the
chedrn in question in the sum of $2,757.72 with stub notation of a "loan payment" and when Defendant wa::-;
aske<l abont it, he stated that it was a loan to him and
!tad been repaid. Defendant admitted writing the check
10 pa)· on n personal obligation but stated that before
doing so had contacted Clal'l\: Fritton who was co-signer
of <·lie('k, and explained that he wanted to write the
dietk to pay off his car, hut was going to buy a truck
nnd camper and would use the same as collateral and
pa>· money hack the next day, and Fritton agreed that
thi:; <.:ould be dom>. Actually, the same day the check
was written Defendant ueposited back the sum of
:+2,3:31.00 whirh he obtained from a loan on the truck
and eamper. rrhe difference he charged off against unpai<l wages which at this time he claimed to be approxirna tel)· $3,000.00.
At this time, it was clear that Defendant had money
eoming, over the $426.72 difference, in wages, and he
also claimed money coming from unrepaid credit card
eharges owed by the Corporation.
vVith regard to the $52.90 check to the .Jefferson
Standard Insurance Company there could be no question
hut that, at the time he wrote thc checks, he told the
Insnrance ( 1ornpany ag·ent hr did not have his personal checkhook, but had draws <.:0111ing for unpaid wages
against the Corporation and would credit this on the
hooks as such.
It \rnUlll see111 that there is absolutely no evidence

nC an i11lention to Jefranu the Corporation at any stage.
7

l\fr. Wilcox claimed that the Compan.\· owed him
money from wages and credit card charges, and used
these checks as draws. He had done so in the past and
had money coming at the end of the year. He and hi 8
wife were paying on two personal loans for monev advanced to the Corporation and were at this time paying
on credit card charges for the Corporation. He clai1m
the Company mved him over $3,000.00.

He was unfamiliar with bookkeeping procedures anrl
did not know that it might be improper to make
on wages and moneys owed in this way. He stated that
Mr. Fritton lived in another city and it would have Leen
practically impos8ihle to commlt with him on each check,
80 there was an understanding that Fritton would sign
many blank checks and Defendant could use them as
needed. Defendant did, however, get Fritton's okay lo
write the $2,757.72 check and Defendant did in fact put
back in the Company account $2,331.00 the same day.
There could be no finding of a fraudulent intent at
an_\· time, but merely poor judgment in handling the
transactions as Defendant did.

POINT II
THE. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DI1JFENDANrr'S :'.\ICYrION TO DISMISS
AT rrHE CONCLUSION OF STATE'S CASE.
At the conclusion of the State's case, Defendant
made the l\lotion to dismii;s both charges against ])efendant, which the Court declined to grant, although
from the rnlinp; it appean'rl thr Court fonnd at
some merit in the l\lotion.
8

The argnrnent advanced in Point I would apply to
this point so Defendant will not be repetitious by re-

pcd ing same.

Ernbez;z;lement under which Defendant was charged
defined h>· rl'itle 76-17-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
follows:
7G-17-2 by the officer or agent of corporation." Every officer, director, trustee, clerk, servant or
agent of any association, society ·or corporation, public or private, who fraudulently appropriates to any
w.;e or purpose not in the due and lawful execution
of
trust m1y property which he has in his possession or under his control by virtue of his trust, or
sc'erets the same with a fraudulent intent to appropriate it to use or purpose is guilty of Embezzlement."
In view of the Statute and holding of this Court,
nu fraudulent intent has been shown by any stretch of
th(' evidenee.
Full disclosure was made before both
(-JH•d;;:::; were ·written, notation was made on stubs, and
Dl'femlant lllade all records available at all times. There
was no sho\i·ing of secrecy, trickery, or intentional fraud.
Defendnnt pen;onally requested a thorough accountrng arnl further, asked that a complete set of books be
Hl' never denied \vriting checks for personal
ll;.>L• aud claimed the amounts as unpaid wages, which
11·as trne. 'i'he Company then and now owes Defendant
111011<»· for wages and nnreimbursed credit card charges.
] n one of the leading eases in this State, cited as
:-l'i'..'\.'I' vs HORNE, G2 Utah 37G, 220 P 378, in discus9

sing the intent necessary in the crime of Embezzlement,
the Court said as follows:
"In order to convid one of the crime of Embezzlement the proof must go beyond the mere fact of
showing that the accused obtained the property
of another in some fiduciary capacity and that he
failed to account for it on demand. While there
may be cases where the felonious intent may be
inf erred from the circumstances surrounding the
receipt and withholding of the property, nevertheless, that cannot be so where, as in this case,
the accused claims withholding of the properly
to have been in good faith and without felonious
intent. True, it is that the reasons the accuse<l
may assign for having withheld the property may
not be believed, but if he claims as a defense that
he vvithheld the property in good faith and upon
some reasonable ground, then the necessary felonious intent cannot be inferred from the mere
fact that he failed to account"
r:t'he Court also cited l\IACKLEROY vs PEOPLE,
202 ILL. 473, 66 N.E. 1038. Quoting on the Mackleroy
case, the Court held as follows :
'''l'o the same effect is the case of J\lackleroy
People, Supra. In the latter case it is said •We
are also of the opill ion that the evidence failed
to prove with that degree of tertainty re4uired
by the Rules of Evidence ill criminal cases that
the <lefendant f"raudulPntly convertPcl to her own
use or took and secreted with the intent so to do
10

without the consent of her employer, the money
in <1uestion. The only evidence of a criminal intent is the inference to be drawn from the act
itself. She at no time denied or attempted to coneeal the indebtedness. So it must be said here
that defendant at no time concealed or attempted
to conceal the withholding of the check, and he
as we read the record at all times claimed that
he withheld it for the reason stated."
Tn 8INGLETON
I Cal.)

v8

SINGLETON, 157 P2cl

the Court stated:
''\Yhen a pen;on
goods which he honestly
believes are his own under a claim of title, he is
not guilty of larcen)', nor is such person guilty
of embezzlement of property if it is openly and
avowedly taken under a claim of title preferred
in good faith."

So it is in this case. rl1he accused openly noted the
('lte('k in tlw
check register which was available
tu the officers and agent8 of the corporation. The same
da.\ he a18o made a deposit in a les8er sum with the allegation that the difference \vas charged aganist his earned income not paid to him at that time. rrhere is no evidern•t• to coneeal any of the transactions at any time. It

has 1Jeen 8hown to be merely a continuation of practice
f rnm the inception of the Corporation and not objected
t'l

at an)' ti11w until the filing of this complaint.
In

vs. l\[eCOR;\UCK, 4-1-2 P. 2d 1:3.J,
an Arizona Ca8e the Court impliedly negated the

criminal intent aspect where it i8 8hown that the
transaction was one that had been e8tablished a,
customary practice, stating that the requisite intent in an Ern]W7;'./,lement proseention may he infened from the circumstance of the
acts, such as voluntary acts in depriving the entrustor of his property, or taking large sums of
money without approval and contrary to
ed practice.
In this case I believe it has been clearly shown tlrnt
it was an established practice accepted by the offiteri
and directors of the Corporation 3nd reported to tltt'
bookkeeper tliat payment of wages to the accused
made hy the accused paying personal indebtedness anrl
personal accounts with corporate fund8, with disclosure'
being made periodically. All of these checks made payahle to the accused on the Compan)' account8 were openl.'; made on Company checks ·with tlte notations made on
the stnbs with a fe"\V exceptions when the stubs were not
available and at no time is there a claim that these ehetk'
and 'ledgers were not made available and in fact it
dear])· shown that the)· were rnacle available all dming the course of time involved up throngh 1970.
American .Jurisprnclcnce defines intent as follows:
26 Am ,,T nr Sd EMBEZZLEl\fENrr (Section)
p572, '''l'he l'etention of'
in good faith,
without 8eCl'C('.)' or coneealrnent under a honaficle
elairn of rig11t has(·d npon ieu:sonahle
grnerall» is inco11:,ist<•11t with a fr:rndulrnt intl•nl
to

'L'hii'.:> is so, even though the accmsed
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mistakEm in his claim of right the retention of
iiwney or property belonging to an employer may
not constitute embezzlement if the accused retaines it in the belief that he had a right to
keep it for his compensation."
Defendant feels that as a matter of law, the Court
.:houlcl !Jave granted Defendant\; Motion to Dismiss and
erred in denying such Motion.

POIN11 III
THE r_eRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER
POUH TO THE .JURY, DEF'INING rrHE MEANING OF THE WORD ''FRAUDULENTLY" AS
IT APPLIES TO EJ\IBEZZLEl\IENT STATU11 E.
At the time the case was ::mbmitted to the Jury, the
Defendant requested the Court to give to the Jury the
following instruction:
"As used in Embezzlement statute providing for
punishment of a fiduc:iary of money who fraudulently converts it to his own use, quoted word
"fraudulently" has some other than its usual
meaning. It implies deceit, deception, artifice
and trickery and means conversions made with
intent to deprive beneficiary of the money peruranPntly. It is not sufficient to show that the
accused may have rn:;ed poor judgment in his
method of accounting."
TltP Court ene<l in refusing to give this instruction.
l'ncler tlw Statut(•, Title 76-17-2, Utah Code Annotated,
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1953, reciting that fraudulent intent was a necessary e!e.
ment of the charge of Embezzlement, and under the rul.
ings of this Supreme Court, the Jury is entitled to an
explanation as to what constitutes fraudulent intent and
this was the import of the requested instruction.
The evidence set forth in the State's case certainly
justified this requested instruction, and in all probability
the Jury rendered its verdict because Defendant in fart
wrote the checks. They did not properly determine question of intent at the time.
We feel that all the State showed was poor judgment
on Defendant's part.
There was a great deal of evidence admitted into
the record, which proba:bly confused the Jury on just
what elements they were to consider and what
they were to find. The evidence and arguments concerning the proper way to keep the records and impropriety
of an officer dealing with the Corporation in the manner
Defendant di4apparently swayed the Jury.
'l1hey undoubtedly would have been properly advised as to the meaning of fraud as it applies to Embezzlement if this instruction had been given and we contend
that the Court erred in its refusal to give this instruetion.
CONCLUSION
It is our conclusion that we have the classic case of

a person, skilled in the field of a branch of medicine, bnt
totally unskillrd m the fields of business, trying to run

14

tlw
He acted logically but not in accordance with the rules of Corporate dealings.
Defendant had sole re:sponsibility of establishing
the Corporation, setting up and managing the business
rif the Corporation and did so in the way it seemed logical
(o him.
If the Corporation needed money, Defendant
'"onlcl obtain a iwrsonal loan and put it in the Corporatirlll aeetmnt. If he had wages coming, he would draw some
d1eeks on wages :specifically and on some occasions pay
a lJersonal bill on Company check and charge against
wages, or money loaned. He permitted Company charges
to be pl.aced upon his credit cards when necessary.
·when the two checks, subject of the charge of Emkzzlement, were written, he had money coming from the
l'orporatio11. Wben he wrote the large check after obtaining permission to do :so from the Corporation cohe entered notation ''loan payment" and the same
da.'' deposited an amount approximatety $400.00 less
bade in the Uornpany account, which he obtained from a
prr:;onal loan, and debited the difference against wages.
On the :smaller check he told the payee that he had
a draw on the Company account, and this amount was
rfongecl to Defendant a:s wages.
'!'he 8tate did not show ui1y evidence of a fraudulent
inic·nt. Actually good faith on the part of Defendant was
('!earl.'' shown.

It is suinnitted that the Court erred in refusing to
the eharges against the Defendant at the conelu:-;ion of the State's
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It is further submitted that the Jury erred in its
verdict on both counts in that no fraudulent intent
shown.
The trial court erred in refusing to give Defendant\
Instruction Number four defining the meaning of the ,
fraudulent intent necessary for a conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
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